

WILDFIRE TECHNICAL STUDY
Camp Alonim Expansion
(1101 Peppertree Lane, Ventura County)

Prepared for:

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1.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1.1 Introduction

Envicom Corporation has prepared this Wildfire Technical Study in support of the Environmental Impact Report to be completed by the County of Ventura, pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for the Camp Alonim expansion project (or project) proposed by the American Jewish University on an approximately 2,700-acre property on five parcels located at 1101 Peppertree Lane in Brandeis, an unincorporated area in Ventura County.

Project Site Location

Camp Alonim (project site or site) is located in a small valley within the northern end of the Simi Hills, situated south of the City of Simi Valley and north of the site of the former Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL). The camp is located on the same property as the American Jewish University's Brandeis-Bardin Campus, along with the Ziering Brandeis Camp Institute. Related facilities have been operating in the same location since 1947, with Camp Alonim being founded in 1953. Local access to the site is provided by Peppertree Lane, accessed from Tapo Canyon Road in Simi Valley. Within the property Peppertree Lane and High Road form a loop around the campus/camp facilities. The House of the Book access road extends northeast from the southern end of the loop and continues past as a secondary access road exiting at Hidden Ranch Drive. Nearly the entirety of the American Jewish University facilities (AJU facilities) are clustered together within a small valley within Meier Canyon, an approximately 1.5 square-mile area, which begins near the border with Simi Valley and extends approximately 0.8 mile south into the hills. The valley is at approximately 960 to 1,000 feet above mean sea level (AMSL), and the adjacent hilltops extend up to approximately 1,200 to 1,300 feet ASML. The location of the project site is provided on **Figure 1, Project Location Map**.



Surrounding Land Use

The clustered AJU facilities are surrounded on all sides by open space which is owned by AJU. The property parcels are bordered by business park and light industrial uses to the north, some residential subdivisions within the hills to the west, open space and a few foothill subdivisions to the northeast, open space to the east and southwest, and open space and the SSFL to the south.

Regional access to the project site is provided by the 118 Freeway which is approximately 1.2 miles north of the point where the City and AJU property borders meet, accessed directly from Tapo Canyon Road.


Project Description

The existing facility is operating under a CUP which allows for up to 400 campers aged 6-16 at Camp Alonim during a 10-week period in the summer between June and August, up to 72 college age attendees at the Ziering Brandeis Camp Institute (BCI) during the same period, and younger children, up to 125 at a time, attend the Gan Alonim day camp during the same period. Up to 200 staff members are allowed to support camp operations. In addition, the facility is allowed to host up to 15 events per year with up to 300 guests and may be used for smaller assembly purposes at other times. The proposed project would add 18 new structures and a 58-space parking lot near the southern developed area of the valley, and change the operational parameters of the CUP. The proposed new construction includes a new 4,460 square-foot welcome center, thirteen 1,930 square-foot duplex camper cabins, three 441 square-foot head counselor cabins, and a new parking lot with 58 spaces adjacent to the welcome center. To accommodate the new construction three existing housing trailers, two cottages, a cabin, and a garage would be demolished. Changes to operations would be an increase in the capacity of campers aged 6-16 from 400 to 500, and an




Aerial Source: Google Earth Pro, Oct. 16, 2023. Site Plan Source: Abramson Architects, July 27, 2022.

increase in the number of allowed annual events to 150 with up to 300 attendees, 10 with up to 500 attendees, and six with up to 1,000 attendees. **Figure 2, Existing Site Plan**, provides a site map showing the existing facilities, and **Figure 3, Proposed Construction**, shows the proposed camper's village and welcome center.



Source: Abramson Architects, July 28, 2023.



Source: Abramson Architects, June 8, 2023.

CAMP ALONIM WILDFIRE ANALYSIS

Proposed Construction

envicom

No Scale  FIGURE 3

2.0 ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING

2.1 Topography, Climate, and Vegetation Overview

The Simi Hills range covers roughly 58 square miles, bordered by the geographic Simi Valley to the north, the San Fernando Valley to the east, the Santa Monica Mountains to the south, and the Conejo Valley to the west. The majority of the hills are within the borders of Ventura County, with small portions of the foothills to the east, northeast, and south within Los Angeles County. Peaks within the hills reach up to 2,400 AMSL though most of the range is below 2,000 AMSL. The hills reach the Santa Susana Mountains at the point of the Santa Susana Pass in the northeast corner of the range, occupied by the 118 Freeway, and reach to the Santa Monica Mountains along the southern border, separated by the 101 Freeway corridor.

Valleys abutting the Simi Hills are generally fully developed suburbs dominated by single-family residential subdivisions, with the City of Los Angeles in the San Fernando Valley, the City of Simi Valley in Simi Valley, and the City of Thousand Oaks in the Conejo Valley. The majority of the Simi Hills are undeveloped open space with the exception of a few residential subdivisions in the foothills, the Bell Canyon development to the east, and the former SSFL. The Simi Hills have a Mediterranean climate characterized by cool wet winters and long, dry summers, as does the majority of California outside of desert areas. Prevailing winds in the area tend to come from the southwest or the northeast, with northeastern winds more prevalent in the fall and winter.

The Mediterranean climate type is globally rare and produces native vegetation that is adapted to both drought and fire. The most abundant native vegetation communities found in the Simi Hills include chaparral, sage scrub, oak woodland, and oak savannah. Some areas, primarily in canyons, will host riparian vegetation and may contain stands of sycamore or willow dominated riparian plant communities. Oak savannah landscapes are often dominated by non-native annual grasses and forbs, and some areas of former scrub will have been converted to non-native annual grasslands.

The AJU facilities are located at the northern edge of the Simi Hills within a small northwest to southeast oriented valley surrounded by hills. Meier Canyon Creek, an intermittent stream, flows through Meier Canyon which begins southwest of the facilities and then turns north near the halfway point of the AJU valley. From here the creek follows the canyon north running along the western edge of the valley until it joins with the Arroyo Simi located at the southern edge of the Simi Valley. Vegetation in and amongst the AJU facilities is dominated by exotic landscaping, most of it several decades old, with manicured lawns and landscaping around newer facilities located closer to the center of the valley. Oak and sycamore trees are found in places and there is generally less exotic landscaping and more native vegetation near the southern end of the valley. The hillsides immediately abutting the facilities are a mix of scrub, disturbed non-native annual grassland, and oak woodland. Hillsides on the northeast side of the facilities are primarily disturbed grassland on the lower slopes and contain thin scrub higher up. The lower portions of these hillsides are grazed by cattle. Hillsides on the southwest side of the facilities are a mix of intact scrub, and disturbed grassland and oak woodland.

2.2 Wildfire and Influencing Factors

The majority of California, outside of desert areas, has a Mediterranean climate characterized by wet winters and long, dry summers. Southern California's Mediterranean climate areas are characterized by winter rains over a period of 3-4 months, followed by practically no precipitation for the rest of the year, with high temperatures through the summer and fall. Wildfires are a regular occurrence, and the native ecology is adapted to it, with numerous plant species dependent upon fire for propagation. However, native

plants and plant communities are adapted to particular fire regimes which involves the frequency and intensity of wildfire.¹ These native or “natural” fire regimes are those patterns that developed over many thousands of years prior to any settlement. The native distribution of plants and plant communities throughout the state is the result of the particular climate needs (moisture, temperature, sunlight, etc.) of plants, conditions necessary for growth and propagation (soil type, associated plant communities, dispersal requirements, etc.), and the native fire regime for any given area, wherein the plant communities themselves have some influence on the behavior of wildfires.^{2,3}

Prior to European colonization, fires would either be started by lightning strikes or deliberately set by native people in order to manage the landscape for various purposes. Native American fire management practices integrated well with natural fire regimes as fires would only be set when the weather allowed for their control. Although native fire practices manipulated and changed landscapes for human benefit, the ultimate ecological effects would not be considered negative. Post colonization two major factors were introduced which significantly interrupted the established fire regime and have resulted in negative outcomes to California ecosystems: the decoupling of climate conditions and wildfire, and the introduction of non-native invasive annual grasses and forbs. The decoupling occurred by introducing fire suppression as the default wildfire management policy, and the fact that most wildfires are now started by humans.^{4,5} Suppression has had the most deleterious effects on forestlands, particularly yellow pine forests common in central and northern California. The natural fire return interval for such ecosystems, the number of years between fires, ranges between five to 50 years.⁶ These forests developed alongside frequent, lower intensity fires. The suppression of wildfires in these areas, along with extensive logging, has resulted in changing the composition of the forests, increasing tree density and homogeneity which makes wildfires, when they occur, much more intense. And as the Mediterranean climate is also one that experiences periodic drought, this increase in trees and decrease in species diversity results in significant tree mortality when a drought occurs.

In southern California the dominant chaparral plant community has a longer natural fire return interval than pine forests, with a range between 30 and 90 years. Coastal sage scrub, though greatly reduced in area, has an even broader range of between 20 to 120 years.⁷ In both cases location would be the primary determinant of the natural fire return interval. Some locales would rarely if ever experience lighting strikes, and not every expanse of sage scrub would be subject to human intervention. For these plant communities fire suppression has not been the issue but rather too frequent fires due to human activity. Such a fire regime can weaken the ability of landscapes to regenerate and result in vegetation type conversion wherein high-quality sage scrub or chaparral habitat is replaced by low-quality non-native annual grassland habitat. Wherever invasive annual species dominate susceptibility to wildfire will increase. Non-native invasive annual species are especially fire prone as they germinate, flower, and die more quickly than native species,

¹ Halsey and Syphard, The Ecological Importance of Mixed-Severity Fires, Chapter 7: High-Severity Fire in Chaparral: Cognitive Dissonance in the Shrublands, 2015

² University of California, Sustainable and Fire Resistant Landscapes, Climate, Fire, and Habitat in Southern California, circa 2009, available at: https://ucanr.edu/sites/safelandscapes/fire_in_southern_california_ecosystems/

³ California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Fire and Resource Assessment Program (FRAP), California’s Forests and Rangelands 2017 Assessment, August 2018

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Kramer, et al., International Journal of Wildland Fire 28, 641-650, High Wildfire Damage in Interface Communities in California, July 30, 2019.

⁶ California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Fire and Resource Assessment Program (FRAP), California’s Forests and Rangelands 2017 Assessment, Table 4.1, August 2018

⁷ Ibid.

and thereby result in tinder-dry landscapes earlier in the year. In addition, the lifecycles of the invasive species results in less moisture retention in the soil compared to native species. When these species come to dominate a landscape their quick lifecycles and drying of the soil continually outcompete native species and regeneration of native plants is often not possible without human intervention. The most fire prone landscapes in southern California therefore tend to be areas that are dominated by non-native annual grasses and forbs. These areas are usually low in biological diversity, often dominated by a handful of invasive species, and as such wildfires can readily ignite and spread rapidly as all of the fuel is quickly and easily consumed. These sort of landscapes are very common in southern California and often the result of historic cattle grazing where native trees and shrubs were removed and non-native grasses and forbs deliberately sowed as forage. The previously-native understories of oak savannas have also been replaced by invasive grasses and forbs in the same manner. As such, these plant communities have become fire prone, and because the invasive understories deplete soil moisture, the ability of the trees to regenerate has been severely compromised, which can lead to a full conversion to non-native annual grassland.⁸

Fire season in a typical year in southern California runs from June to September, though in years of drought and Santa Ana winds wildfires can also occur between October and April.⁹ Santa Ana winds originate from the Great Basin and upper Mojave Desert. They move west across those areas and then turn southwest as they drop from the higher elevations of the Transverse Ranges into coastal California. The winds increase in speed as they funnel through mountain passes, and gain in temperature as well. The result is strong, warm, very dry winds that sweep through the most heavily populated areas between the high desert and the ocean. Apart from the Santa Ana winds phenomenon, the number and size of wildfires have overall been increasing in the last decades owing to anthropogenic induced climate change. Since 1985 the number of wildfires and areas burned by wildfire in the west have continually increased due to rising temperatures, increased drought, and earlier snowmelt, and the length of fire season has increased so that it is nearly year-round in some places.¹⁰ Climate change effects do not cause more wildfires as most fires are caused by human activity, rather they extend wildfire conditions into more places and across a greater time span by reducing moisture in the landscape. It has been observed that the frequency of days with extreme (95th percentile) fire weather during the autumn season in California has more than doubled since the early 1980s.¹¹

Although any property within the wildland urban interface (WUI) is subject to the risk of wildfire, the character of its location and surroundings will greatly influence overall susceptibility. The topography of a particular location plays a significant part in the site's vulnerability or susceptibility to wildfire risk. Fire naturally moves more rapidly uphill than downhill or across a flat area, as radiant heat from a fire at the base of a slope preheats the vegetation above it, which allows a fire to consume fuel more quickly. The steeper the slope, the faster the rate of spread. This remains true whether wind is going with or against a fire traveling uphill. Once a fire reaches the crest of a hill, the rate of spread will normally slow and can actually halt in some conditions, especially if there is upslope airflow coming from the opposite direction.¹²

⁸ Mc Creary, University of California Agriculture and Natural Resources, Regenerating Rangeland Oaks in California, 2009.

⁹ Jin, et al., Environmental Research Letters, Identification of Two Distinct Fire Regimes in Southern California: Implications for Economic Impact and Future Change, September 8, 2015.

¹⁰ Schoennagel, et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Adapt to More Wildfire in Western North American Forests as Climate Changes, May 2, 2017.

¹¹ Goss, et al., Environmental Research Letters, Climate Change is Increasing the Likelihood of Extreme Autumn Wildfire Conditions Across California, August 20, 2020.

¹² University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Topographic Influences on Wildland Fire Behavior, C. 2009

The aspect of a slope (the direction it's facing) determines how much solar radiation it receives. North (and east) aspect slopes receive far less solar radiation than south (and west) aspect slopes, and therefore will tend to have lower temperatures throughout the year, retain more moisture, and therefore have denser vegetation. These characteristics make north and east aspect slopes less susceptible to wildfire relative to south and west aspect slopes, which will have more flammable fuels, higher temperatures, and lower humidity. Increased density of vegetation on a north or east aspect slope does mean there is more potential fuel. However, shade from dense vegetation helps reduce soil temperature, which in turn helps the plants retain moisture for longer into the year, all of which reduces the likelihood of the start and spread of wildfire. Topography also influences how much wind a location will receive, which may contribute to the drying of vegetation and the effects of wind during a wildfire event. For example, wind speed increases where the air becomes constricted, such as in a saddle between two peaks, within a narrow canyon, or at the crest of a hill.¹³

2.3 Project Site Wildfire Risk

The hillsides immediately abutting the facilities are a mix of scrub, disturbed non-native annual grassland, and oak woodland. Hillsides on the northeast side are primarily disturbed grassland lower down and contain some thin scrub higher up. Lower portions of these hillsides are grazed by cattle. Hillsides on the southwest side are a mix of intact scrub and disturbed grassland north of Meier Canyon, and scrub and oak woodland south of Meier Canyon. The general composition of denser vegetation on hillsides to the southwest and sparser vegetation on hillsides to the northeast would be expected as south/west aspect slopes receive much greater solar radiation than north/east aspect slopes, as previously described. However, the land use history of the site has played a large role in determining current site conditions. Aerial photographs from 1928 show that all of the vegetation on the northeast hillsides nearly to the peaks was removed, along with flat areas in the valley on the west side of Peppertree Lane. These flat areas were planted with orchards by 1939, and more east-aspect hillsides deeper into the canyon were cleared, though never planted. The orchards were removed sometime before 1959 after the AJU facilities were established, and the areas cleared for them are still readily noticeable.¹⁴ The large fallow field near the middle of the valley is the most noticeable remnant of the orchards, but modern aerial images from severe drought years, particularly 1994 and 2020, clearly show the outlines of the areas cleared in the late 1930s.¹⁵

Although these close by denuded areas would harbor fast-burning invasive annual species, they are routinely maintained for fire safety purposes, with the flat areas mowed or otherwise mechanically treated, and the hillside areas grazed by a herd of cattle the facilities keep for the purpose. The hillsides have burned in the past and will no doubt burn at points in the future, as will practically any hillside within the Simi Hills, but they do not pose a particularly significant threat to the AJU facilities provided quick-burning fuel continues to be maintained. There is more fuel available wherever the hillsides weren't historically cleared, and in particular on north-aspect slopes, but as explained previously these slopes are relatively less susceptible to wildfire or the fast spread of wildfire.

The valley is naturally less susceptible to wildfire than the hillsides as fire moves most aggressively uphill, and any fire moving toward the campus from offsite would be moving downhill. Vegetation within the valley itself does pose a wildfire risk as there is a substantial amount of fuel available, but given the wildfire history of the site it would appear to be manageable. There are numerous blue gum eucalyptus (*Eucalyptus*

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Historic aerial images downloaded from UCSB FrameFinder tool: Flight C-348 frames J-26 & K-27 (1928); Flight C-5750 frame 200-7 (1939); Flight AXI-1959 frame 10w-144 (1959).

¹⁵ Google Earth images 05/31/1994 (US Geological Survey) and 03/08/2020 (unidentified)

globulus) trees on the site, mainly located in the area south of the entrance gate and north of the proposed new construction. These trees are adapted to fire and are highly flammable, but it is primarily the bark which presents the greatest hazard. The bark is deciduous and constantly sheds from the trees creating a thick layer of highly combustible material beneath. Pieces of bark still hanging on the trees also create a fuel ladder for wildfire to reach the crown, and the leaves contain volatile oils that can produce a hot fire when ignited, which can contribute to the spread of the fire. However, although the leaves contain volatile oils they are classed as intermediate in their resistance to combustion, and juvenile leaves are more highly resistant to flaming.¹⁶ Despite the presence of these trees the areas where they are most abundant have experienced little to no wildfire, and there has never been a catastrophic fire within the valley fueled by them. This can be attributed to a combination of the protected nature of the valley and fuel management of the trees. During a site visit on October 19, 2024 there did not appear to be excessive amounts of bark duff present, and eucalyptus near active areas such as structures, playing fields, and roads appeared to have lower limbs removed and less hanging bark than what would be naturally present. Trees further from active spaces had more bark shed on or around them but not an amount that would indicate there's no management. Blue gum eucalyptus shed extensively and a lack of regular maintenance would be readily apparent.

Other vegetation within the valley is a combination of naturally occurring native species, exotic landscaping plants, and invasive species. The southern portion of the site, particularly near buildings 93 to 117 on the project site plans (**Appendix A**), has far fewer introduced species and mostly consists of native species which are tended where near structures. Near the larger Camp Alonim buildings (48-54) there is a mix of turf, some landscaping, tended vacant areas, and native vegetation. Near the center of the valley around the cottages and adult activity buildings (27-44) there is turf, tended vacant areas, some native vegetation, and legacy landscaping likely from when the buildings were constructed. Areas around houses are tended but generally do not appear to be landscaped, rather vegetation around the houses are a result of historic choices. Besides the eucalyptus trees there doesn't appear to be much landscaping on site that can be problematic for fire planning, with the exception of some pampas grass located by building No. 44, and some palm trees here and there, both of which can be managed to reduce risks. Vacant, weedy areas between the High Road and Peppertree Lane would be a concern, except these appear to be regularly tended. The site has been occupied and in use for over 100 years, and although past land use decisions would not be considered optimal today in regard to wildfire planning, the current maintenance regime would appear to mitigate those issues.

2.4 Wildfire History

According to California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) records there have been 13 wildfires that have come within one mile of the AJU facilities since recordkeeping began in 1898 and up to 2023, the most recent data year.¹⁷ Of these 13 wildfires only four have reached the grounds of the facilities. Of these four fires only one, the 1967 Devonshire-Parker fire, has burned within a substantial portion of the facilities. This fire reached the southern area of the facilities where the new buildings are proposed, and the area at the gated entrance to the property. The 1958 Parker fire reached an area south of High Road, the 1970 Clampitt fire essentially reached the perimeter of the valley on the east, west, and south, and the 1992 Sequoia fire reached the western edge of the valley. The bulk of Meier Canyon, including the northern half of the AJU facilities, has remained untouched by wildfire according to state records.

¹⁶ Esser, Lora L. 1993. *Eucalyptus globulus*. In: Fire Effects Information System, [Online]. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Fire Sciences Laboratory (Producer). Accessed November 6, 2024 at: <https://www.fs.usda.gov/database/feis/plants/tree/eucglo/all.html>

¹⁷ CalFire, California Fire Perimeters (all) dataset, available at: <https://data.ca.gov/dataset/california-fire-perimeters-all>


Table 1, Project Vicinity Fire Frequency, lists wildfires recorded within one mile or less of the project site up to the year 2023. Included is the time interval between all wildfires, between large wildfires over 5,000 acres in size, and between wildfires that have reached the AJU perimeter.

Table 1
Project Vicinity Fire Frequency

Fire	Interval Between Large Fires ^a	Interval Between Fires Reaching the Valley ^b	Interval Between All Fires Within One Mile ^c
1951 Susana Knolls			Reference Start
1958 Santa Susana Dump			7
<u>1958 Parker*</u>		Reference Start	-
1966 Black Canyon			8
1967 Devonshire-Parker*	Reference Start	9	1
1970 Clampitt*	3	3	3
1974 Runkle Canyon			4
1979 Susana Airport			5
1982 Hall			3
1992 Sequoia		22	10
2005 Topanga*	35		13
2006 Sequoia			1
2013 Hidden			7


^a In years, large fires (> 5,000 acres) in **bold**.
^b In years, fires that have reached the valley containing the AJU facilities.
^c In years, fires within 1 mile of the project site.
* Fires that have reached the House of the Book location

Fire return intervals within the mile radius are frequent, but overlapping frequency is patchy. **Figure 4, Fire History (1893-1975)** and **Figure 5, Fire History (1976-2023)** show wildfire perimeters within a one-mile radius of the facilities, split between wildfires prior to 1975 and wildfires after 1975. Fire frequencies in some localized areas are not necessarily outside of a normal range for sage scrub habitat type, but clearly the area is an active wildfire zone. However, the widest sections of the canyon, including the site of the AJU facilities, are a significant exception from the norm. This can be attributed in part to the fact that because there is an active facility in the canyon the site would receive active fire protection when threatened. However, if the site location was at severe risk of wildfire it probably would have burned at some point. That is to say, site conditions clearly play a significant role in the site's defensibility from wildfire. Wildfire is most aggressive moving uphill, and the site is located at the base of hills. This reduces site vulnerability and increases defensibility. With properly maintained fuel modification perimeters and irrigated landscaping, a building located in the valley should be easily defensible. The valley runs northwest to southeast, which is perpendicular to prevailing winds which come from the southwest or the northeast, and the topography of the canyon would not appear to significantly affect windspeeds or wind direction. A wildfire coming from the east would be slowed considerably once it reaches the crest of the hill, even if being driven by winds. The lower slopes of the northeastern hills are tended for fire-safety purposes, and there is a lack of extensive, readily-combustible fuel between structures and the lower slopes. At the location of structures there are 100-foot fuel modification perimeters which reduces available fuel even more. The combination of fire moving downslope with little available fuel should make even a worst-case wildfire event (Santa Ana wind-driven wherein winds blow southwest) manageable. A wildfire coming from the west would also slow considerably once reaching the crest of the hill. On these southwest hillsides wildfire would encounter northeast aspect slopes which contain better-hydrated, less-combustible vegetation and



Source: ESRI World Topographic Map Background Image, 2021. Map Source: CalFire, 2020.

No.	Year	Name	Acres
1	1951	Susana Knolls	2,348.25
2	1958	Santa Susana Dump	522.27
3	1958	Parker	1,024.67
4	1966	Black Canyon	1,827.85
5	1967	Devonshire-Parker	23,093.70
6	1970	Clampitt Fire	115,537.00
7	1974	Runkle Canyon	93.99
8	1974	Runkle Canyon	168.68



Source: ESRI World Topographic Map Background Image, 2021. Map Source: CalFire, 2020.

No.	Year	Name	Acres
1	1979	Susana Airport	131.32
2	1982	Hall	2,648.49
3	1992	Sequoia	387.77
4	2005	Topanga	23,396.40
5	2006	Sequoia Fire	345.32

cooler soil temperatures. In either instance defending the site would be a fairly straight-forward proposition of attacking fires at the base of the hills where the fires have the least amount of energy due to slope, lack of fuel, and/or aspect of the slope.

2.5 Project Wildfire Planning

AJU management is fully cognizant of the risks of wildfire to and from the facilities, and manages that risk through maintenance, rules, and protocol. AJU employs a full-time ground maintenance crew of 16 people, all of whom live on the site. This crew provides all landscape maintenance onsite with the exception of work in trees above 20 feet high, in which instances outside contractors would be employed. Per VCFD requirements brush and weeds are cleared within 100 feet of all structures on a regular basis, and crews will regularly prune the lower limbs of trees near use areas, prune dead limbs, and remove bark duff from the eucalyptus trees. Landscape fire maintenance is also occasionally assisted by the VCFD. The AJU site has a long-standing relationship with VCFD Station 41 which uses the site for crew training exercises, including the removal of dead trees from the site. AJU also keeps a herd of cattle on site which are moved across the northeastern hillsides to keep fuel levels low. When there is a threat of wildfire the herd is moved to a location away from the threat. In addition, the facility maintains a bulldozer on site which may be used for fuel clearance, and two water reservoir tanks are maintained on site for firefighting purposes.


Fire safe rules include a prohibition of smoking anywhere within the facilities, and no outdoor food cooking. As part of the camping experience there are campfires (within contained fire pits) on site used during camping season, but they are limited to four locations and are only built, lit, and extinguished by AJU staff. The locations of the campfires are shown on **Figure 6, Camp Fire Pit Locations**. Water is available at each fire pit and AJU staff must monitor the campfires during use and verify that they are cold when extinguished. Campfires are not allowed to be used for events except with written permission, and the same requirements of staff control apply.

Emergency protocols are encapsulated in AJU's comprehensive emergency response plan titled "Emergency Preparedness and Procedures." This document was prepared for camping season but it is a framework for response to an emergency in any context and would apply to the management of emergencies during an event as well. The document delineates a clear command hierarchy and provides name and contact information for each person with a specific role. Staff carry walkie-talkies and the document assigns specific radio channels for each operational section. It also establishes a specific code for each type of emergency, a specific means of broadcasting the alert, and specific procedures for each emergency situation. A parking and evacuation route map is maintained as part of document and would be updated with the new facilities.

AJU has received approval for their Preliminary Fire Protection Plan from the VCFD which includes approval of the landscaping and fuel modification zones around the new structures. A final fire protection plan will be required to be reviewed and approved by the VCFD prior to construction and would include more information regarding fire safety and preparation than the preliminary version.

Current management staff were present on site during the 2005 Topanga and 2006 Sequoia wildfires and the outline of management response during those events was provided by the current director of operations, Dan Maccabee:

1. Site management response:
 - a. Inform all residents of possible need to evacuate (all full time grounds staff carry walkie talkies)



Source: Abramson Architects, July 28, 2023.

- b. Move cattle / horses to the pasture farthest away from the fire
- c. Inform any conference group on site of the possible need to evacuate
- d. Make sure both reservoirs are full
 - i. Reservoir a: 608,000 gallons
 - ii. Reservoir b: 300,000 gallons
- 2. Make sure fire department is offered housing / food / anything they need to stay on property.

2.6 Firefighting Resources and Evacuation Response

Resources

Fire prevention and suppression services are provided by the Ventura County Fire Department (VCFD). The Department has approximately 600 employees and 33 fire stations throughout Ventura County. Battalion 4 commands the Simi Valley area, and is headquartered at Fire Station 41, located at 1910 Church Street in Simi Valley. The Battalion Chief commands two fire stations in Moorpark and six fire stations in Simi Valley. The nearest fire station to the project site and the primary responder to the site is VCFD Station 41, approximately two driving miles northwest from the site. Station 43, East Simi, is approximately three driving miles northeast of the site and would be the secondary responder to the site when and if needed.

The VCFD has a goal of a first unit on scene within 8.5 minutes (with 5 minutes travel time) for suburban areas 90 percent of the time and extinguish 95 percent of all wildfires at 10 acres or less. The strategy of crew deployment is to spread crews across a community for quick response to keep emergencies small and with positive outcomes, without spreading the crews so far apart that they cannot amass together quickly during a major emergency.¹⁸ There is one additional fire station within approximately three miles of the project site, Station 46 to the north, and two more within five miles, Station 45 to the east and Station 47 to the northeast. Simi Valley is roughly eight miles east-west and four miles north-south, and this spread of stations allows the District to meet its response time goals. Other VCFD stations around the Simi Hills include Station 36 in Oak Park and Station 37 in Thousand Oaks, both located in southern portions of the hills. The District also has a number of mutual aid or automatic aid agreements with other fire service agencies including Los Angeles County and the City of Los Angeles, which are employed on an as-needed basis. LA County's nearest fire station, Station 75, is located in Chatsworth and would be poised to assist with fires in the southeastern Simi Hills, including the SSFL. The City of Los Angeles has multiple fire stations in the West Hills, Chatsworth, and Porter Ranch area including Stations 106, 107, 96, 28, and 8. In addition, every emergency response institution within the State of California is bound by the terms of the California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement which creates a statewide mutual aid network wherein facilities throughout the state can be mustered to render mutual aid to divert natural or manmade disasters. Emergency response institutions also all use the same incident response system which allows easy collaboration, which is discussed more in this section below, and the regulatory regime behind these requirements is discussed briefly in Section 3.

Wildfires near a VCFD station are first addressed by that station. Response levels are based on type of incident, location, weather conditions, existing or potential emergencies, resources available and the information the VCFD is working with. Staffing levels and the staffing of specialized resources are adjusted according to existing or potential conditions. The closest available resource, plus the closest available resources of the type needed, respond to incidents. The minimum response team to a wildland fire is 2 Engines, 1 Battalion Chief, and 7 firefighters. A full response team would include the Battalion Chief, 5

¹⁸ Ventura County Fire Protection District, Regional Fire Services Standards of Cover Analysis, Volume 2 of 3 Technical Report, June 2017.

engines, a water tender truck, dozer, 2 helicopters, and multiple hand crews.¹⁹ Once on the site personnel determine the needs of the incident and responses are adjusted accordingly.

In extraordinary wildfire circumstances mutual aid and automatic aid agreements are key for a rapid response, and this is true for all firefighting operations throughout the state. The response to the Woolsey Fire in 2018 illustrates this well.²⁰ At the time of the Woolsey Fire the VCFD was fully engaged in battling the Hill Fire, which at the time appeared to be a greater threat. The starting location of the Woolsey Fire activated the Mutual Threat Zone Plan, a mutual-aid response agreement between the Ventura County, Los Angeles County and Los Angeles City Fire Departments. All three organizations dispatched resources to the Woolsey Fire, and once the Hill Fire advanced into the burn scar left by the 2013 Springs Fire, firefighters were able to contain that fire, freeing additional resources to contend with the Woolsey Fire.

The Camp Fire in northern California was occurring simultaneously and this did not allow northern or central California resources to move south, as would normally be the case. Because Santa Ana winds had created perfect fire conditions throughout the state, and no central or northern California resources would be available to move south, other southern California firefighting agencies had to retain many of their assets, otherwise their locales would be vulnerable to the same conditions. Ultimately approximately half of the requested resources were provided for the Woolsey Fire. In effect, the 2018 simultaneous occurrences of the Camp, Hill, and Woolsey Fires exhausted the capabilities of the mutual aid system. During the initial stages of the Hill and Woolsey fires, the Ventura County, Los Angeles County and Los Angeles City Fire Departments were all engaging in fire perimeter control, structure defense, and life safety actions. Once the Woolsey Fire entered the complex terrain of the Santa Monica Mountains as it headed toward the ocean, and it became clear mutual aid resources had been exhausted, the Woolsey Fire command team strategically shifted all resources to prioritize life safety actions. That is, the responders could not focus on containing the fires or saving structures, but rather had to shift focus to saving people. This resulted in single-family houses within the WUI being lost, but casualties being limited to three people, and 250,000 people successfully evacuated despite the speed of the fire and constraint on resources.²¹

During peak firefighting operations, VCFD, supplemented by the fire mutual aid system, brought nearly 4,000 emergency response personnel, 577 fire engines and 22 aircraft to combat the Woolsey Fire. A total of 295 structures within Ventura County were either damaged or destroyed, but no major population centers were impacted. During the fire, the Ventura County Sheriff's Office issued evacuation orders to more than 80,000 Ventura County residents using door-to-door notifications, VC Alert notifications, Wireless Emergency Alerts, the Emergency Alert System, news outlets, websites, social media, and community liaisons. Six emergency shelters served over 9,000 meals and snacks, and five animal shelters cared for 356 displaced animals. The VC Emergency website had more than two million unique page views and the emergency hotline received over 43,000 calls for incident information.²²

Evacuation Response

The Ventura County Sheriff's Office takes primary responsibility for issuing evacuation orders or otherwise coordinating evacuation proceedings. In an emergency situation this is accomplished through the Office of Emergency Services (OES). The OES is the County body responsible for coordination of County

¹⁹ Ventura County Fire Department, Emergency Response, accessed at: <https://vcfd.org/services/operations/emergency-response/>

²⁰ The Woolsey Fire did not threaten the project site as it started south of the site in Santa Ana conditions, which effectively means the fire would not have been able to spread to the north with any significant force.

²¹ County of Los Angeles After Action Review of the Woolsey Fire Incident, November 2019.

²² County of Ventura, The Hill & Woolsey Fires Emergency Response After-Action Review, January 2020.

resources during an emergency or disaster event, pursuant to the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) developed by the State. SEMS is a management system that provides an organizational framework for disaster response and coordination, and acts as the umbrella under which all response agencies may function in an integrated fashion. By law, state agencies must use SEMS, and local agencies must use SEMS in order to qualify for State funding of certain response related personnel costs.

The County OES is responsible for countywide disaster planning, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. In the event of a disaster, OES is responsible for the County's Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and coordination of the County's Emergency Management Team, and for recovering the County's disaster response costs from the state and federal governments. The OES Manager is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the County's disaster preparedness and response program and the development of the County's Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). The EOC is a centralized location for coordinating countywide emergency response activities. The County EOC is the coordination point between the cities, special districts, and the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), all of which have their own EOC operating under the same SEMS protocol. The EOC serves to support field operations and liaison with all public and private disaster response agencies at all levels of government. The EOC is activated in response to major events and disasters that are beyond the scope of normal day-to day emergencies.²³

The organizational framework of the SEMS is repeated at the State, County, and participating City, or agency level. This allows for efficient communications, coordination, and collaboration across agencies regardless of the nature of event or locale. Responsible hierarchies are standardized, as are the means and methods of information gathering and dissemination and sharing of resources. In an emergency, at the core of the operations of SEMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), which provides guidance for how to organize assets to respond to an incident, and processes to manage the response through its successive stages. Response assets are organized into five functional areas: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Administration/Finance.

2.7 Emergency Access

Emergency access to the site is provided by Peppertree Lane primarily via Tapo Canyon Road, though Peppertree Lane is may also be accessed from Guardian Street. Secondary emergency access is provided by the House of the Book access road which is connected to Hidden Ranch Drive. Internal to the AJU site, High Road is being modified with the addition of five fire access turnarounds along its length between Peppertree Lane and the new construction, and one fire turnaround will be added to the House of the Book access road where it meets the new welcome center parking lot (**Appendix B**). The new facilities will be accessed from either Peppertree Lane or High Road, with the camper village connected by 20-foot wide roads to High Road directly and an improved 24-foot wide road that connects High Road to Peppertree Lane, the intersection of which provides access to the visitor center.

²³ County of Ventura, Ventura County Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan, C. 2021.

3.0 REGULATORY SETTING

3.1 Federal

The project site is located within a State Responsibility Area (SRA) for purposes of fire protection (i.e., an area where the state government is responsible for wildfire protection), and therefore the federal wildfire regulations do not apply to the project site or within the immediate area. The federal National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from disaster, and would be relevant should a wildfire event become extraordinary and require federal support. NIMS is intended to standardize response to emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions or multiple agencies and is complementary to the state SEMS system. Both systems utilize the ICS as their core field operations protocol so that all parties are essentially speaking the same language.

3.2 State

California Governor's Office of Emergency Services

The Governor's OES oversees and coordinates emergency response preparedness of other state agencies and produces the State of California State Hazard Mitigation Plan. The 2023 State Hazard Mitigation Plan represents the state's primary hazard mitigation guidance document that includes discussions on wildfire and structural fire hazards and provides mitigations for effective wildfire suppression planning. The Hazard Mitigation Plan also includes goals and objectives related to reducing risks associated with wildfire. The OES also regulates the SEMS (discussed above) which creates the statewide framework within which the State, counties, and local governments coordinate responses during emergency events.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

CAL FIRE is the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. It is dedicated to the fire protection and stewardship of over 31 million acres of the state's wildlands. Sections 51175 – 51189 of the California Government Code define CAL FIRE's responsibility for identifying FHSZ throughout California. The FHSZs on CAL FIRE maps are based on fuel loading, slope, fire history, weather, and other factors as directed by California Public Resources Code, Sections 4201 – 4204, and California Government Code, Sections 51175 – 51189. FHSZs are ranked from Moderate to Very High and are designated within a Federal Responsibility Area (FRA), SRA, or Local Responsibility Area (LRA), which indicate the jurisdiction as belonging to a federal agency, CAL FIRE, or local agency, respectively. The agency that performs firefighting activities can be different from the responsible agency if there is a contract agreement in place, which is the case for the project site. Local agencies have the responsibility to designate, by ordinance, very high fire hazard severity zones (VHFHSZ) within their jurisdictions, per sections 51178.5 and 51179 of the Government Code.

The Board of Forestry and Fire Protection

The Board of Forestry and Fire Protection (Board) is a Governor-appointed body within CAL FIRE. It is responsible for developing the general forest policy of the state, determining guidance policies for CAL FIRE, and represents the state's interest in federal forestland within California.

The Board is charged with developing policy to protect all wildland forest resources in California not under federal jurisdiction. These resources include major commercial and non-commercial stands of timber, areas reserved for parks and recreation, woodlands, brush-range watersheds, and all private and state lands that contribute to California's forest resource wealth. The Board develops and adopts the Strategic Fire Plan

pursuant to broad direction provided under Public Resources Code (PRC) Sections 4114 and 4130. The 2024 Strategic Fire Plan organizes the State's vision and values regarding fire management and provides direction for CAL FIRE's statewide planning and implementation of fire protection services, activities, and regulation. In addition, the Board develops and adopts the Fire Safe Regulations which establish minimum wildfire protection standards in conjunction with building, construction and development in VHFHSZs. As such, the project will be subject to those regulations.

The Board is also responsible for reviewing the safety element of cities or counties that contain VHFHSZs. The Board responds with findings and recommended changes regarding policies and land use in VHFHSZs that will protect life, property, and natural resources from unreasonable risks associated with wildfires, and the methods and strategies for wildfire risk reduction and prevention within VHFHSZs. The County Board of Supervisors or City Council must consider the Board's recommendations and respond in writing if any of the recommendations are not accepted.

The Office of the State Fire Marshal

The Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM) is the CAL FIRE program tasked with, among other things, developing and reviewing regulations and building standards and providing training and education in fire protection methods and responsibilities. The OSFM is responsible for the development of Wildland-Urban Fire Area Building Standards, which were approved by the California Building Standards Commission in 2005, amending California Code of Regulations, Title 24, known as the California Building Standards Code (CBC). The amendment added Chapter 7A to the CBC and the requirements became active in 2008.

California Building Code

Part 9 of the CBC is known as the California Fire Code (CFC). There are three chapters within the CFC that are most relevant to wildfire safety:

Chapter 7, Fire and Smoke Protection Features

Chapter 7 regulates materials, systems and assemblies used for structural fire resistance and fire-resistance-rated construction separation of adjacent spaces to safeguard against the spread of fire and smoke within a building and the spread of fire to or from buildings.²⁴ Chapter 7 applies to all permitted structures.

Chapter 7A, Materials and Construction Methods for Exterior Wildfire Exposure

Chapter 7A establishes minimum standards for the protection of life and property by increasing the ability of a building located in any Fire Hazard Severity Zone to resist the intrusion of flames or burning embers projected by a vegetation fire and contributes to a systematic reduction in conflagration losses.²⁵ Chapter 7A applies to all new buildings located within a FHSZ and wherever local regulation may require. The proposed project is subject to Chapter 7A requirements and all new structures will therefore meet all ignition-resistant construction standards of the chapter.

Chapter 9, Fire Protection Systems

Chapter 9 specifies when fire protection systems are required, and specifies the design, installation, and operation of those systems. It addresses requirements for buildings, facilities, storage, and processes, and addresses safe storage, and use of hazardous materials, as well. Fire sprinkler requirements, fire flow

²⁴ State of California, California Building (CBC) Code Chapter 7.

²⁵ State of California, CBC Chapter 7a.

standards, and emergency access roads standards are components of the chapter. Chapter 9 requirements are applicable throughout the state.

California Public Resources Code

California PRC Section 4290 requires minimum fire safety standards related to defensible space that are applicable to residential, commercial, and industrial building construction in SRA lands and lands classified and designated as VHFHSZs. These regulations include road standards for fire apparatus access, standards for signs identifying roads and buildings, fuel breaks and green belts, and minimum water supply requirements. These regulations do not supersede local regulations, which are equal to or exceed minimum regulations required by the state.

California PRC Section 4291 requires a reduction of fire hazards in SRA lands around buildings located adjacent to a mountainous area, forest-covered lands, brush-covered lands, grass-covered lands, or land that is covered in flammable material. It is required to maintain 100 feet of defensible space around all sides of a structure, but not beyond the property line unless required by state law, local ordinance, rule, or regulations. Further, California PRC Section 4291 requires the removal of dead or dying vegetative materials from the roof of a structure, and trees and shrubs must be trimmed from within 10 feet of the outlet of a chimney or stovepipe.

PRC Section 4005 was amended in 2021 to adopt California's Wildfire and Forest Resilience Action Plan as state policy. The Action Plan was written by the Forest Management Task Force which was created pursuant to an executive order passed by Governor Brown in 2018 (Executive Order No. B-52-18) to develop the strategy and means to treat one million acres annually for fire resilience and recovery.

California Government Code

Section 51182 of the California Government Code applies defensible space requirements to VHFHSZs within LRA lands or otherwise designated by the local agency. It requires maintenance of 100 feet of defensible space around all sides of a structure and allows local agencies to determine if such space should extend beyond property lines. It allows the intensity of fuel management activities to vary with more intense fuel reduction used closer to the structure, within 5 to 30 feet, than used beyond that distance. The regulations in Section 51182 are based upon regulations promulgated by the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection, in consultation with the Office of the State Fire Marshal.

3.3 Local

Ventura County Fire Code

The Board of Directors of the Ventura County Fire Protection District, adopted by reference the 2019 California Fire Code, including portions of the 2018 International Fire Code, and portions of Title 19 of the California Code of Regulations, with amendments, to produce the Ventura County Fire Code (VCFC). The VCFC includes Appendix W which establishes minimum requirements in WUI Areas to increase the ability of a building to resist the intrusion of flame or burning embers being projected by a vegetation fire. The appendix includes provisions for the identification of Hazardous Fire Areas that require applicable Defensible Space provisions included in this VCFC and enforced by the Fire Code Official and applicable state and local fire-resistive building standards that are required and enforced by the local building official. Appendix W consolidates the County's approach to regulating properties within VHFHSZs. The Code also provides regulation of water supplies necessary for fire protection and fire protection systems related to wildfire and standard construction activities or certain use permits. In addition, landscape plans are subject

to review according to the provisions in the Code related to defensible space standards within VHFHSZs and local Hazardous Fire Areas.

VCFD Ordinance 29 establishes minimum and cumulative design and maintenance standards for emergency fire access roads within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Ventura County Fire Protection District. The standards apply to public and private property, and includes road design, signage, and marking requirements and provisions for enforcement. The standards are based upon those established in Section 1270 of Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations.

Ventura County Fire Department

The project is within the Ventura County Fire Prevention District and VCFD provides firefighting services to the site. The VCFD created the Fire Hazard Reduction Program to coordinate fire prevention efforts within VHFHSZ areas, acknowledging “A working partnership between property owners, their neighbors, and the Ventura County Fire Department is the best defense against disastrous fires.”²⁶ The Wildland Fire Action Plan is the guidance document produced by the VCFD which provides education and direction to property owners within VHFHSZs.

Ventura County Sheriff Office of Emergency Services, Emergency Operations Plan

This 2021 Ventura County Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan (OEP) is the County’s preparedness document designed to be read, understood, and exercised prior to an extraordinary emergency. It designates the County of Ventura as part of the California SEMS and the NIMS. It clarifies each element of the emergency management organization and their responsibilities in the maintenance of appropriate and current Standard Operating Procedures resource lists and checklists that detail how assigned responsibilities are performed to support implementation of the EOP and to ensure an effective response during a major disaster. The EOP delineates the organization, framework, and command hierarchy for the County’s response to major disasters.

²⁶ Ventura County Fire Department, Fire Hazard Reduction Program (FHRP), accessed at: <https://vcfd.org/fire-hazard-reduction-program-fhrp/>

4.0 THRESHOLDS OF SIGNIFICANCE

In accordance with Appendix G of the State CEQA Guidelines, a project located in or near SRAs or lands classified as VHFHSZ would potentially result in a significant impact with regard to wildfires if it would:

- Substantially impair an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan.
- Due to slope, prevailing winds, and other factors, exacerbate wildfire risks, and thereby expose project occupants to pollutant concentrations from a wildfire or the uncontrolled spread of a wildfire.
- Require the installation or maintenance of associated infrastructure (such as roads, fuel breaks, emergency water sources, power lines or other utilities) that may exacerbate fire risk or that may result in temporary or ongoing impacts to the environment.
- Expose people or structures to significant risks, including downslope or downstream flooding or landslides, as a result of runoff, post-fire slope instability, or drainage changes.

The analysis of the potential wildfire impacts of a project is to assess any significant environmental effects the project might cause or exacerbate “by bringing development and people into the area affected.”²⁷ That is, the impacts the project might have on the environment by being placed near a high fire hazard area, not the risks to the project itself by being within a high fire hazard area (with the exception of the second criteria). The project is the increase in events and the construction and operation of the proposed new buildings as previously described.

²⁷ CEQA Guidelines Section 15126.2(a).

5.0 IMPACT ANALYSIS

Impact 5.1 Emergency Plans

A project may have a significant impact if it would substantially impair an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan.

There are no specific emergency response or emergency evacuation plans that pertain to the County or the site. Rather, emergency response and evacuation proceedings are conducted on a dynamic basis according to the framework established in the EOP, which integrates with the state SEMS and the federal NIMS. As the EOP is a planned framework for emergency response the project cannot impair it. However, it could be possible for the project to impair emergency responders or emergency response activities to an extent that it significantly impaired the execution of the emergency response framework during an emergency. Impairment might occur if the project introduced conditions that placed a significant burden on emergency responders during an emergency response situation. Examples might include creating steep grades or undersized roadways that responders must navigate, or bottlenecks created by project placement or design that could impair orderly emergency access to or from the project site or within the vicinity. This could occur during construction or during operations.

Construction

During construction of the proposed project, all equipment staging would occur within the property, and workers' vehicles would be parked on the property. Construction material hauling vehicles would travel on Tapo Canyon Road which is a five-lane arterial for much of its length, which narrows to a two and three-lane arterial closer to Peppertree Lane. The road, within the City of Simi Valley, is designed to accommodate heavy truck traffic from the light industrial buildings to the north even at its narrowest point, and construction truck traffic would not significantly disrupt or block the road. Any necessary utility lines would be extended from existing utilities on-site, so there will be no need to place lines in Tapo Canyon Road. If encroachment into the public right-of-way were necessary for some reason, work would be coordinated with the City to provide adequate notification and a construction-phase traffic control plan, including warning signs, traffic cones, and/or flagmen, as necessary. Roads internal to the site are private and can be kept free and clear of traffic by the project proponent. As such, construction activities would not substantially impede emergency vehicle access or impair an emergency response plan or evacuation plan, and construction impacts would be less than significant.

Operations

Physical Changes

The project would redevelop a portion of the site by demolishing buildings 9-11, and 55-57 as shown on the site plans (Appendix A), and construct thirteen 1,930 square-foot duplex camper cabins and three 441 square-foot head counselor cabins in the vicinity of existing buildings 9-11, and a 4,460 square-foot welcome center and parking lot with 58 spaces in the vicinity of existing buildings 55-57. The VCFD enforces particular design and access standards determined by the CBC or other regulatory agencies described earlier, which are designed to ensure a development does not impact emergency access or evacuation plans. These requirements include that all building exteriors can be accessed by fire lanes or within sufficient proximity to a fire hydrant or standpipe, that fire access lanes have sufficient turning radius at all turns in the road, and that there is sufficient water flow for firefighting operations, among other requirements.

Fire access within the camper village is accomplished with internal 20-foot wide streets, the existing High Road, and the north-south connecting road. Access to the welcome center is accomplished with Peppertree Lane and the north-south access road which meet adjacent to the welcome center in a large circular intersection. The welcome center can also be accessed from the parking lot via the House of the Book access road. In addition, five fire vehicle turnaround areas will be added to High Road and one to the House of the Book access road, a plan that has already been reviewed and approved by the VCFD. Each exterior façade of the new buildings are either accessible from a fire lane or within sufficient distance from a fire lane (length of fire hose) or a hydrant. Currently there are nine hydrants on site and two water reservoirs. There are two hydrants near the site of the new construction and it is anticipated that at least one more will be added per VCFD requirements, along with upgrades to the pipes serving existing hydrants. The precise number and location of new fire hydrants or standpipes will be placed according to VCFD specification, and fire-flow, sprinkler systems, and fire alarm systems will all be subject to review and approval of the VCFD. The design of the project buildings will conform to all regulatory requirements regarding fire safety, as will the landscaping and fuel modification activities, therefore, physical changes to the site would not impact emergency response to a significant degree.

Activities

Current operations include events with up to 300 attendees and three camps operating at the same time (June-August), Camp Alonim, BCI, and Gan Alonim Day Camp, wherein over 700 visitors and staff may be on the site at one time. The proposed CUP would add another 100 campers to Camp Alonim, increasing the number of visitors and staff on site at one time during the camp season to over 800. The CUP would also allow more and larger events on site, with a maximum number of attendees of 1,000 people hosted up to six times a year. Examples of past events include a wedding with 250 guests at the House of the Book, and a high school retreat in the central areas of the valley with 300 students and staff. Future events are expected to be similar in character but sometimes on a larger scale. The salient aspects of the proposed changes for this analysis are the number/frequency of events compared to current activity, and the number of people and vehicles on site at one time.

The number or frequency of events would present no new or different challenges to emergency response. Statistically the likelihood of an event occurring at the same time as a wildfire emergency is increased, but this does not present an impairment of wildfire emergency response proceedings. If there is a wildfire emergency during an event, or at a time when only staff and staff residents are on the property, the potential duties and response of emergency responders would not substantially change. Those duties would include issuing evacuation warnings and evacuation orders, and possibly accessing the site to fight a wildfire. These remain the same pre- and post-project.

The number of people and vehicles at the site during a wildfire emergency could conceivably have an effect on wildfire emergency response, within the premise that people or vehicles on site, or leaving the site, could interfere with emergency response or wider evacuation proceedings. However, this would be unlikely and no significant impacts would be expected.

The AJU site has a long-standing relationship with VCFD Station 41, which uses the site for crew training exercises. On a yearly basis Station 41 will maintain various unpaved fire roads located on the property and hold hand crew training sessions on site. Additionally, each year the VCFD and the Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD) participate in joint heavy equipment training sessions on the property. VCFD will also take out dead trees from the property for training purposes and will occasionally clear non-paved roads that are not fire roads. This relationship has been in place for decades and, consequently, the VCFD is very familiar with the property. AJU's Emergency Preparedness and Procedures plan creates an adequate

framework for staff emergency response as it delineates a clear command hierarchy, assigns specific radio channels by staff position for communications during an emergency, establishes a code for each type of emergency, and specific procedures for each one. Provided staff are familiar with the plan, as they are required to be, there would be little reason to doubt the facility would be able to direct people or vehicles in a manner that there was no substantial impairment of access to the site during a wildfire event. For larger events AJU may hire outside staff to assist with parking, but as the facility has decades of experience hosting events it can be reasonably assumed that the presence of outside staff would not impair their ability to direct people or vehicles to ensure adequate emergency access on site. The combination of the VCFD's familiarity with the site, plus AJU's ability to manage people and vehicles on the site during an emergency would not result in significant impacts to wildfire response within the site boundaries.

Potential impacts to wildfire response through impairment of responders off site or evacuation proceedings off site is a more theoretical proposition. No roadway network is designed to accommodate all possible users in an area using the roads all at once, and as such, traffic congestion during evacuation proceedings is an expected condition. This is taken into account by the emergency response apparatus and one of the reasons why evacuations are normally controlled by a singular authority, which in this instance would be the Sheriff's OEC, as explained in Section 2.5. The fact that the project would contribute traffic to roadways if an evacuation were to occur does not necessarily present any impacts given how evacuations are conducted. Evacuation warnings or evacuation orders are issued according to conditions as wildfires are inherently dynamic and unpredictable. Multiple factors such as weather conditions, fuel loads, recent fire history, road conditions, available resources, etc., may influence the ordering and timing of evacuation orders, but it is the experience and training of the emergency response agencies, operating within the framework of the SEMS and ICS, that effectuates evacuation decisions. Evacuation warnings and orders may be made in a phased manner according to vulnerability, location, or other factors, which would enable traffic surges on roadways to be minimized over time allowing for more an orderly flow of vehicles exiting an evacuation area. Once a warning or order is issued, it is important to note that the timely evacuation of properties depends upon timely cooperation from the individuals under evacuation orders.

The increase in potential attendees during an evacuation would not substantially change the facility's ability to conduct an evacuation of the site nor potential effects on evacuation proceedings off site. A wildfire emergency that would require an evacuation of the site may occur in two ways: A) A wildfire has begun on the site or close enough to the site to pose an immediate threat, and B) A wildfire has begun somewhere off-site and is predicted to move toward the site.

Scenario A is unlikely as AJU controls access to their property and absent a human-caused ignition wildfire on the project property is unlikely. Regardless, in the unlikely event of an A scenario, evacuation would either proceed according to an order from the OEC or possibly according to a decision by AJU staff. In such a scenario vehicles could be leaving the site at the same time emergency response vehicles are responding upon the same roadways. Wildfire emergency response is a matter of access, the ability of crews and equipment to access those areas where they are needed. AJU has the ability to control evacuation of the project site, and it would be speculation to suggest evacuation from the site would not be orderly to such an extent that said traffic could substantially impair emergency crews. The AJU Emergency Preparedness and Procedures document, plus their decades of experience conducting events on the site, demonstrate that it is reasonable to assume evacuations from the site would occur in an orderly fashion. Tapo Canyon Road between the AJU entrance and the intersection of Royal Avenue is two lanes wide (not counting turn lanes) and is designed to accommodate 800 to 1,600 vehicles per hour in each direction. North of Royal Avenue Tapo Canyon Road is four lanes wide (not counting turn lanes) and is designed to accommodate 1,600 to 3,200 vehicles per hour in each direction. The only traffic using Tapo Canyon Road during an evacuation would be from the AJU facilities and, if during business hours on a weekday, by some

of the light industrial buildings south of the Arroyo Simi. At this point, however, Guardian Street is also available, which leads to Tapo Street, both of which would be able to accommodate a similar number of vehicles per hour as the lower portion of Tapo Canyon Road. In addition, it should be noted that the further structures are from wild areas (the hills) the less need there is to evacuate during a wildfire. Regardless, the capacity of the available routes away from Peppertree Lane should be sufficient to allow an orderly evacuation of the site without substantial impairment of emergency responders traveling to the site or vehicles off site traveling north.

Regarding scenario B from above, the site would only be evacuated if the sheriff's office issued orders to do so. This would be preceded by evacuation warnings. In this scenario there would be little to no opportunity for evacuation proceedings to have any influence on emergency response as the Sheriff's OEC and the VCFD would be conducting evacuations with the specific intent of ensuring they are effective and do not interfere with emergency response.

As mentioned, the public's responsibility to be prepared for emergencies and to follow orders during an emergency is paramount to public safety. This is evidenced in the Ready Set Go! (RSG) program, which the VCFD participates in. The RSG program was developed within California and is now utilized nationwide, managed by the International Association of Fire Chiefs. RSG is an educational and awareness campaign focused on helping residents living in high fire areas prepare for the eventuality of living through a wildfire. The VCFD RSG program consists of outreach and information available from the department.²⁸ The VCFD consolidates emergency preparedness outreach and information into two primary public documents, the Ready Ventura County Emergency Preparedness Guide, and the RSG Wildfire Action Plan (Action Plan) guidebook. The Action Plan emphasizes that practical limits on firefighting resources requires individual residents to take responsibility for their response to wildfire. In this assessment of what impacts the project may have upon wildfire emergency response functions, it must be considered that the AJU has the ability to conduct and control evacuation proceedings. This is not true for a residential subdivision within a similar context. In addition, while the proposed project consists of an expansion of the camping program, the program operates for under three months in a year, and though the number and size of events would be expanded, these events would occur only for discreet periods. This is in contrast to a subdivision which is occupied by substantially more people on a year-round basis.

In summary, construction activity, and the physical changes to the site, would not substantially impair emergency response crews or proceedings. If there was a wildfire emergency during a project event or during camping season the project would add traffic to roadways, however, traffic congestion during evacuation is a known and expected variable that is accounted for in the emergency response framework and actively managed during emergencies by the OEC, including police presence on the ground. The project has decades of experience conducting events on the site, has the ability to determine how evacuation of the site is accomplished, and has a comprehensive response plan and procedures in place to guide their efforts. These factors, plus the capacity of Tapo Canyon Road (and Guardian Street) and the close familiarity the VCFD has with the project site and its operations, would lead to the reasonable conclusion that an increase in the number of campers and the number and size of events is manageable, and would result in less than significant impacts in regard to the substantial impairment of an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan, which in this context amounts to a substantial impairment of emergency response crews and proceedings during a wildfire emergency.

²⁸ Ventura County Fire Department, Ready Set Go!, accessed at: <https://vcfd.org/public-info/ready-set-go/>

Impact 5.2 Exacerbate Risk

A project may have a significant impact if, due to slope, prevailing winds, and other factors, it would exacerbate wildfire risks, and thereby expose project occupants to pollutant concentrations from a wildfire or the uncontrolled spread of a wildfire.

Development near the ridge of a vegetated slope exacerbates the wildfire risk the development experiences because fires burn upslope much faster than they do downslope or across flat areas. A development placed in such a location then, via its increased risk, could further exacerbate wildfire risk in the area, and would be placed in a location where project occupants could experience the worst effects of a wildfire. Development within a heavily vegetated area where winds are accelerated by topography could also exacerbate wildfire risk in a similar manner. The proposed physical changes to the project site are not significantly different from the existing conditions as proposed structures will occupy places which are currently active. The campers village is upslope from the buildings below it but it is a gentle slope and the area between the campers village and buildings south will be developed and landscaped. The furthest west cabins are adjacent to a vacant area, but the immediate surroundings will be irrigated landscaping according to VCFD guidelines, and fuel modification requirements will ensure there is a 100-foot perimeter where all non-landscaped areas are managed for fuel reduction purposes. The visitor's center will be located at the bottom of the slope and will have the same landscaping and fuel modification requirements applied to it. In both instances the new buildings are not any more exposed to wildfire risk than existing structures on site. Although the project is located within Meier Canyon it would not appear to experience accelerated wind patterns. The slopes adjacent to the valley are fairly gentle, and the valley runs northwest to southeast, which is perpendicular to prevailing winds which come from the southwest or the northeast. This configuration would not be expected to create significant wind-tunnel effects. This is evidenced by the fact that the bulk of the valley has not burned in a wildfire for as long as records have been kept.

Post-construction the buildings will expand the developed area of the valley and will reduce wildfire hazards by removing older structures and vacant, non-landscaped land. In addition, the buildings will be fire-hardened pursuant to provisions found in Chapter 7A of the CBC. As previously explained, Chapters 7, 7A, and 9 of the CBC regulate building materials, structural design as it relates to fire containment, safety features, and fire sprinkler systems. Chapter 7A provisions harden the structure against wildfires, but also serve to further reduce the likelihood of the development burning out of control. Chapter 7A compliant features include a Class A roof assembly, which is the class of roof that is effective against severe fire test exposure, eave or soffit venting that will not allow combustible embers to enter, and non-combustible exterior cladding. These exterior safeguards greatly reduce the probability that an exterior fire could be ignited. On the interior, the structures will have fire sprinklers. Information from the U.S. Fire Administration's National Fire Incident Reporting System and the National Fire Protection Association indicate that in structural fires sprinklers were effective at controlling the fire in 96 percent of the fires in which they operated.²⁹ Thusly, risk of wildfire to the proposed structures and their immediate surroundings is substantially reduced in comparison to existing conditions.

Therefore, the placement of the proposed structures would not significantly exacerbate wildfire risk or expose occupants to wildfire pollutants, and the expansion of irrigated landscaping and fire-hardening and sprinklers in the interior of the structures would serve to reduce wildfire risk relative to current conditions, and impacts would be less than significant.

²⁹ Ahrens, National Fire Protection Association, U.S. Experience with Sprinklers, July 2017.

Impact 5.3 Infrastructure

A project may have a significant impact if it would require the installation or maintenance of associated infrastructure (such as roads, fuel breaks, emergency water sources, power lines or other utilities) that may exacerbate fire risk or that may result in temporary or ongoing impacts to the environment.

The project must install six turnaround areas on High Road and the House of the Book access road to provide adequate fire access. Construction of these turnarounds would not exacerbate fire risk as the work involved is essentially a matter of earthmoving and paving, neither of which are high-fire-risk activities. The turnarounds will not result in any ongoing impacts to the environment as they are a minor expansion to an existing road in areas that are not environmentally sensitive, and their installation would not impact the potential or scale of wildfire risk. Impacts would be less than significant.

Impact 5.4 Post Fire Impacts

A project may have a significant impact if it would expose people or structures to significant risks, including downslope or downstream flooding or landslides, as a result of runoff, post-fire slope instability, or drainage changes.

The proposed new construction will not modify the site in any way that would create significant risks to structures or people should there be a rain event after a wildfire. The project will not be modifying or building upon any significant slopes that could become unstable if, post-construction, the new facilities or landscaping were damaged or lost in a fire. The campers village is built on a gentle slope which is suitable for development and does not require special stabilization. Roads and foundations will be concrete or asphalt and the stability of the slope would not be compromised if the cabins were damaged or destroyed by wildfire (which is itself unlikely, see Impact 5.2). The project will not involve significant excavation that requires the use of retaining walls, and the contours of the slope will largely be retained, so there would be essentially no more chance of a landslide post-construction than pre-construction under any circumstances.

There is a FEMA Zone A flood zone (1% annual chance of flooding) in the lowest parts of the valley, and the welcome center will be located just north of it. As the building will be fire-hardened and buffered by irrigated landscaping and a fuel modification zone, the likelihood of it catching fire or being significantly damaged in a wildfire is very low. Regardless, if the building were to be damaged or destroyed in a fire event the likelihood that significant amounts of debris from the building would enter the floodplain is very low. The building is single-story, located in a fairly flat area outside of the flood zone, and built to withstand wildfire; its situation is not precarious and a rain event after a wildfire event would not expose people or structures to significant risk. Impacts would be less than significant.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

Provided AJU continues to maintain the project site and surroundings for the purposes of reducing wildfire risk, and staff are trained and ready to act during an emergency situation according to established procedures, the addition of new buildings on site and the expansion of potential visitors and events to the site would have a less than significant impact with regard to all four CEQA Wildfire thresholds.

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8.0 PREPARERS AND PERSONS CONSULTED

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
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- Dan Maccabee, Senior Director of Operations, American Jewish University
- Adrian Breitfeld, Vice President for Finance and Administration, American Jewish University

APPENDIX A

Project Site Plan



EXISTING BUILDINGS					
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	EXISTING(No CHANGE)	EXISTING(TO BE REPURPOSED)	DEMOLISH	PART OF CAMP USE
2	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
3	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
4	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
5	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
6	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
7	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
8	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
9	STAFF HOUSING	No	No	Yes	No
10	STAFF HOUSING	No	No	Yes	No
11	STORAGE GARAGE	No	No	Yes	No
13	COTTAGE 12	Yes	No	No	No
14	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	
15	COTTAGE 13	Yes	No	No	No
16	MULTIPURPOSE SPACE	Yes	No	No	No
25	SHOP BUILDING	Yes	No	No	No
26	LANDSCAPE BUILDING	Yes	No	No	No
27	COTTAGE 1	Yes	No	No	No
28	COTTAGE 2	Yes	No	No	No
32	STORAGE AND LOUNGE	Yes	No	No	No
33	COTTAGE 5	Yes	No	No	No
34	COTTAGE 6	Yes	No	No	No
35	COTTAGE 7	Yes	No	No	No
36	COTTAGE 8	Yes	No	No	No
38	DANCE STUDIO AND PROGRAMMING	Yes	No	No	No
39	CHILD CARE CENTER/REGISTRATION	Yes	No	No	No
41	ADULT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX	Yes	No	No	No
42	ADULT DINING ROOM	Yes	No	No	No
43	POOL EQUIPMENT	Yes	No	No	No
58	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
59	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
60	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
61	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
62	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
63	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
64	SILVER BARN/ WORKSHOP	Yes	No	No	No
65	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
66	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
83	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No
90	LIBRARY REPOSITORY STORAGE	Yes	No	No	No
1	GUARD STATION	Yes	No	No	Yes
12	HOUSE OF THE BOOK	Yes	No	No	Yes
17	COTTAGE 14	Yes	No	No	Yes
18	YURT 1	Yes	No	No	Yes
19	YURT 2	Yes	No	No	Yes
20	YURT 3	Yes	No	No	Yes
21	YURT TRAILER BATHROOM	Yes	No	No	Yes
22	COTTAGE 15	Yes	No	No	Yes
23	ADMINISTRATION BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes
24	MAIN LAUNDRY BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes
29	COTTAGE 3	Yes	No	No	Yes
30	COTTAGE 4	Yes	No	No	Yes
31	BUNKHOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes
37	COTTAGE 9	Yes	No	No	Yes
40	BCI REC HALL AND DANCE PAVILION	Yes	No	No	Yes
44	COTTAGE 10/11	Yes	No	No	Yes
45	ALONIM POOL BATHROOM	Yes	No	No	Yes
46	ALONIM POOL BOYS CHANGING	Yes	No	No	Yes
47	ALONIM POOL GIRLS CHANGING	Yes	No	No	Yes

EXISTING BUILDINGS						
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	EXISTING(No CHANGE)	EXISTING(TO BE REPURPOSED)	DEMOLISH	PART OF CAMP USE	COMMENTS
48	ACTIVITIES BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
49	ALONIM STAFF CENTER	Yes	No	No	Yes	
50	ULAM BUILDING AND HEALTH CENTER	Yes	No	No	Yes	
51	BIKE STORAGE SHED	Yes	No	No	Yes	
52	ALONIM CANTEEN	Yes	No	No	Yes	
53	ALONIM DANCE PAVILION	Yes	No	No	Yes	
54	ALONIM DINING HALL	Yes	No	No	Yes	
55	HOUSING TRAILER 1	No	No	Yes	Yes	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR NEW WELCOME CENTER
56	HOUSING TRAILER 2	No	No	Yes	Yes	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR NEW WELCOME CENTER
57	HOUSING TRAILER 3	No	No	Yes	Yes	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR NEW WELCOME CENTER
67	CIT BATHROOM A	Yes	No	No	Yes	
68	CIT BATHROOM B	Yes	No	No	Yes	
69	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
70	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
71	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
72	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
73	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
74	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
75	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
76	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
77	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
78	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
79	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
80	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
81	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
82	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
84	EQUESTRIAN TRAILER	Yes	No	No	Yes	
85	DAY CAMP PROGRAMMING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
86	BROWN BARN	Yes	No	No	Yes	
87	REPTILE / FISH	Yes	No	No	Yes	
88	BATHROOMS	Yes	No	No	Yes	
89	ARCHERY SHADE	Yes	No	No	Yes	
91	SHADED STRUCTURE	Yes	No	No	Yes	
92	RECREATION HALL	Yes	No	No	Yes	
93	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	STORAGE
94	BATHROOM BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
95	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 1	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
96	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 2	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
97	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 3	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
98	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 4	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
99	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 5	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
100	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 6	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
101	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: STEM
102	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: ARTS
103	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: STEM
104	YOUTH COTTAGE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF HOUSING
105	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: ARTS
106	HEAD COTTAGES	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF HOUSING
107	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF LOUNGE SPACES
108	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF LOUNGE SPACES
109	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 1	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF/CAMPER HOUSING
110	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	BATHROOM FOR YACHAD GROUP (10TH GRADE)
111	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 2	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF/CAMPER HOUSING
112	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 3	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF/CAMPER HOUSING
113	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 4	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
114	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 5	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
115	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 6	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
116	BUNK & TENTS	Yes	No	No	Yes	
117	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STORAGE


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1101 PEPPER TREE LN, BRANDEIS, CA 93064
CAMF ALUMINUM

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RA-160 ac

PROJECT NO: CAM21-P1

EXTENDED SITE MAP

A001

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PROJECT NO: CAM21-P1

EXISTING STRUCTURES 1 OF 4

A002

EXISTING BUILDINGS						
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	EXISTING(NO CHANGE)	EXISTING(TO BE REPURPOSED)	DEMOLISH	PART OF CAMP USE	COMMENTS
2	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
3	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
4	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
5	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
6	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
7	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
8	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
9	STAFF HOUSING	No	No	Yes	No	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR CAMPER VILLAGE
10	STAFF HOUSING	No	No	Yes	No	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR CAMPER VILLAGE
11	STORAGE GARAGE	No	No	Yes	No	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR CAMPER VILLAGE
13	COTTAGE 12	Yes	No	No	No	
14	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
15	COTTAGE 13	Yes	No	No	No	
16	MULTIPURPOSE SPACE	Yes	No	No	No	
25	SHOP BUILDING	Yes	No	No	No	
26	LANDSCAPE BUILDING	Yes	No	No	No	
27	COTTAGE 1	Yes	No	No	No	
28	COTTAGE 2	Yes	No	No	No	
32	STORAGE AND LOUNGE	Yes	No	No	No	
33	COTTAGE 5	Yes	No	No	No	
34	COTTAGE 6	Yes	No	No	No	
35	COTTAGE 7	Yes	No	No	No	
36	COTTAGE 8	Yes	No	No	No	
38	DANCE STUDIO AND PROGRAMMING	Yes	No	No	No	
39	CHILD CARE CENTER/REGISTRATION	Yes	No	No	No	
41	ADULT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX	Yes	No	No	No	
42	ADULT DINING ROOM	Yes	No	No	No	
43	POOL EQUIPMENT	Yes	No	No	No	
58	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
59	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
60	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
61	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
62	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
63	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
64	SILVER BARN/ WORKSHOP	Yes	No	No	No	
65	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
66	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
83	STAFF HOUSING	Yes	No	No	No	
90	LIBRARY REPOSITORY STORAGE	Yes	No	No	No	
1	GUARD STATION	Yes	No	No	Yes	
12	HOUSE OF THE BOOK	Yes	No	No	Yes	
17	COTTAGE 14	Yes	No	No	Yes	
18	YURT 1	Yes	No	No	Yes	
19	YURT 2	Yes	No	No	Yes	
20	YURT 3	Yes	No	No	Yes	
21	YURT TRAILER BATHROOM	Yes	No	No	Yes	
22	COTTAGE 15	Yes	No	No	Yes	
23	ADMINISTRATION BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
24	MAIN LAUNDRY BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
29	COTTAGE 3	Yes	No	No	Yes	
30	COTTAGE 4	Yes	No	No	Yes	
31	BUNKHOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	
37	COTTAGE 9	Yes	No	No	Yes	
40	BCI REC HALL AND DANCE PAVILION	Yes	No	No	Yes	
44	COTTAGE 10/11	Yes	No	No	Yes	
45	ALONIM POOL BATHROOM	Yes	No	No	Yes	
46	ALONIM POOL BOYS CHANGING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
47	ALONIM POOL GIRLS CHANGING	Yes	No	No	Yes	

EXISTING BUILDINGS						
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	EXISTING(No CHANGE)	EXISTING(TO BE REPURPOSED)	DEMOLISH	PART OF CAMP USE	COMMENTS
48	ACTIVITIES BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
49	ALONIM STAFF CENTER	Yes	No	No	Yes	
50	ULAM BUILDING AND HEALTH CENTER	Yes	No	No	Yes	
51	BIKE STORAGE SHED	Yes	No	No	Yes	
52	ALONIM CANTEEN	Yes	No	No	Yes	
53	ALONIM DANCE PAVILION	Yes	No	No	Yes	
54	ALONIM DINING HALL	Yes	No	No	Yes	
55	HOUSING TRAILER 1	No	No	Yes	Yes	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR NEW WELCOME CENTER
56	HOUSING TRAILER 2	No	No	Yes	Yes	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR NEW WELCOME CENTER
57	HOUSING TRAILER 3	No	No	Yes	Yes	TO BE DEMOLISHED FOR NEW WELCOME CENTER
67	CIT BATHROOM A	Yes	No	No	Yes	
68	CIT BATHROOM B	Yes	No	No	Yes	
69	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
70	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
71	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
72	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
73	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
74	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
75	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
76	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
77	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
78	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
79	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
80	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
81	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
82	CIT (COUNSELOR IN TRAINING)	Yes	No	No	Yes	
84	EQUESTRIAN TRAILER	Yes	No	No	Yes	
85	DAY CAMP PROGRAMMING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
86	BROWN BARN	Yes	No	No	Yes	
87	REPTILE / FISH	Yes	No	No	Yes	
88	BATHROOMS	Yes	No	No	Yes	
89	ARCHERY SHADE	Yes	No	No	Yes	
91	SHADED STRUCTURE	Yes	No	No	Yes	
92	RECREATION HALL	Yes	No	No	Yes	
93	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	STORAGE
94	BATHROOM BUILDING	Yes	No	No	Yes	
95	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 1	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
96	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 2	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
97	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 3	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
98	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 4	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
99	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 5	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
100	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 6	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
101	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: STEM
102	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: ARTS
103	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: STEM
104	YOUTH COTTAGE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF HOUSING
105	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	No	Yes	No	Yes	PROGRAMMING: ARTS
106	HEAD COTTAGES	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF HOUSING
107	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF LOUNGE SPACES
108	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF LOUNGE SPACES
109	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 1	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF/CAMPER HOUSING
110	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	BATHROOM FOR YACHAD GROUP (10TH GRADE)
111	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 2	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF/CAMPER HOUSING
112	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 3	Yes	No	No	Yes	STAFF/CAMPER HOUSING
113	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 4	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
114	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 5	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
115	YOUTH TENT STRUCTURE 6	Yes	No	No	Yes	CAMPER BUNK FOR YACHAD (10TH GRADE)
116	BUNK & TENTS	Yes	No	No	Yes	
117	YOUTH BUNK HOUSE	Yes	No	No	Yes	STORAGE






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ARCHITECTS

5171 WEST JEFFERSON BLVD., LOS ANGELES, CA 90016
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PROJECT NO: CAM21-P1

ISSUE RECORD

ISSUE NO.	DATE	DESCRIPTION
07.27.2022		CUP RESUBMITTAL

EXISTING
STRUCTURES 2 OF 4

A003

ADDITIONAL SITE PLAN 02

SCALE: 1" = 40'-0"

1

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PROJECT NO: CAM21-P1

ISSUE RECORD		
ISSUE. NO.	DATE	DESCRIPTION
	07.27.2022	CUP RESUBMITTAL

EXISTING STRUCTURES 3 OF 4

ADDITIONAL SITE PLAN 03

SCALE: 1" = 40'-0"

A004

10/15/2024 4:08:08 PM Autodesk Docs://CAM21-P1 Camp Alonim/CAM21-P1 Central RV/T21.nft

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
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ISSUE RECORD

ISSUE NO.	DATE	DESCRIPTION
07.27.2022		CUP RESUBMITTAL



ADDITIONAL SITE PLAN 04

SCALE: 1" = 40'-0"

A005

1

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
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PROJECT NO: CAM21-P1

ISSUE RECORD

ISSUE NO.	DATE	DESCRIPTION
02.08.2021	02.08.2021	SD PRICING SET 1
07.27.2022	07.27.2022	CUP RESUBMITTAL
07.28.2023	07.28.2023	EIR SUBMITTAL

LEGEND

- NOT IN CONTRACT / CONSTRUCTION
- PROPERTY LINE
- NEW TREE. SEE LANDSCAPE DWGS.

A100 SITE PLAN

SCALE: 1' = 60'-0"

1


SITE PLAN

A100

ST FOR NSTRUCTION

CAMP ALONIM

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ENLARGED SITE PLAN - WCO & PARKING LOT

SCALE: 3/64" = 1'-0"



OBJECT NO: CAM21-P1


KEYNOTES

ENLARGED SITE PLAN - WCO & PARKING LOT

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ENLARGED SITE PLAN - HILLSIDE CABINS

SCALE: 1/32" = 1'-0"



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KEYNOTES

PROJECT NO: CAM21-P1

ENLARGED SITE PLAN - HILLSIDE CABINS

APPENDIX B
Fire Access Map



APN 685-0-051-210

APN 685-0-051-040

Permit/Seal

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Consultant



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CAMP ALONIM
MODIFICATION TO C.U.P. 1776

1101 PEPPERTREE LANE, BRANDEIS, CA 93064

File Name: 614000C-EX7015
Dwn. Dsgn. Chkd. 2024.01.17
Revision Sheet Drawing No.
1 of 1

Title
FIRE ACCESS MAP

Project No.
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Scale
Drawing No.